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Abstract
With the rise of anti-free-trade sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a growing urgency by trade negotiators to conclude the 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The harmonisation of non-tariff restrictions is a key component 
of the talks, whilst global modelling databases typically lack a price compatible representation of these measures, which lends a degree 
of bias to ex-ante modelling assessments. In the gravity literature, there is (limited) evidence of non-tariff ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) 
estimates of agriculture and food, although disaggregated agri-food activities and/or bilateral EU-US route specific estimates are still in 
relatively short supply. Using panel data, this study consolidates both of these issues, whilst also proposing an ‘indirect’ gravity method 
as a basis upon which to provide econometric non-tariff AVE estimates compatible with the degree of sectoral concordance typically 
found in global modelling databases. On a general note, the results revealed the presence of significant 'behind the border' trade costs 
on both sides of the Atlantic, which exceed their tariff counterparts. Using simple aggregated averages, our estimates are comparable 
with ‘direct’ gravity method studies. Furthermore, rigorous qualitative and quantitative comparisons on a sector-by-sector basis showed 
that a number of bilateral non-tariff AVEs are also found to be plausible, although in some cases, with recourse to relevant policy 
documents and expert opinion, it is debatable whether the EU or the US is more restrictive. Further work could focus on refining the 
sector specificity of each gravity equation to improve the model’s predictive capacity.
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Introduction
Over the last two decades, the political and economic 
landscape has realigned, in large part, due to the steady 
emergence of the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) and, more recently, the fallout from the financial 
crisis which has saddled many western economies 
with heavy national debts, high unemployment and 
sluggish growth. From the perspective of international 
trade, both factors have impacted not only on the 
format of trade promotion, but also on the nature of 
how trade relations are governed between partners. In 
the former case, there was a time when multilateral 
and regional trade agreements (RTAs) appeared to 
act as complements in promoting liberalisation. For 
example, in the 1990s, as the Uruguay Round was 
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coming to fruition the United States (US) co-signed the 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) agreement. 
Similarly, in the early 2000s, China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) was accompanied by 
European Union (EU) enlargement. With the exception 
of the Bali agreement on streamlining trade facilitating 
customs controls and red tape, the Doha  negotiations 
have largely failed, in large part due to the defensive 
posture of post-crisis Western governments as well 
as the newly strengthened developing country lobby 
with designs on significant improvements on market 
access (especially in agricultural and food products). In 
the ensuing period, the US actively pursued strategic 
‘second best’ preferential trade agreements (PTAs), 
whilst also playing an active role in the on-going Trans-
Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP)1 . For its part, the 
EU has forged a similar path.
Turning to the second issue, the rules governing the 
nature of trade promotion have also evolved. Traditional 
impediments to trade, such as tariffs, continue on 
a downward path. In part, this is credited to the 
effectiveness of the WTO’s monitoring and arbitration 
mechanism, but it is also related to the continued rise 
of covert ‘behind the border’ protectionism in the 
form of industrial policy, export credits or government 
subsidies; or other not so covert measures such as, for 
example, health, safety and technical standards; labour 
and environmental protection laws; treatment of foreign 
investors; intellectual property rights etc. Typically, it 
is the developed countries, with more sophisticated 
institutional capacity, which more vigorously implement 
the latter form of non-tariff measures (NTMs). Taking 
a cynical view, even non-covert NTMs may be used 
as a political tool to deliberately impose a barrier to 
trade, although it has been pointed out, especially in the 
domain of agri-food (OECD, 2011), that trade restricting 
NTMs also pursue legitimate welfare improving 
objectives such as the lowering of negative externalities 
(e.g., reduced risk of pest or diseases, improved animal 
welfare) or even reduced information asymmetry (e.g., 
food labelling).
In this context, the US has tried to influence the 
terms upon which RTAs should be negotiated and 
implemented, by seeking to harmonise said measures 
with like-minded partners with a view to promoting 
‘free and fair trade’ (The Economist,  2013). In 2011, the 
seeds were planted for a potential EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) at a High 
Level Working Group meeting on jobs and growth 
(HLWG). A significant part of the trade negotiations 
is dedicated to the establishment of a set of bilateral 
regulatory integration rules on NTMs relating to 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS), technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) and intellectual property rights (IPR).
In the gravity literature, estimates of EU and US 
non-tariff ad valorem equivalent (AVE) trade costs for 
aggregate agriculture and food activities are available, 
both of a bilateral- (ECORYS, 2009; CEPR, 2013; 
European Parliament ((henceforth EP), 2014) and 
unilateral (Egger et al., 2015) nature. Moreover, EP 
(2014) focuses on SPS and TBT measures and provides 
estimates for an array of disaggregated agricultural and 
food sectors. More recently, Arita et al. (2015) estimate 
bilateral NTM costs for specific SPS and TBT measures 
and selected food sectors. As a first aim, this paper 
seeks to consolidate the literature by providing gravity 
based EU-US bilateral non-tariff AVE estimates for a 
broad selection (18) of agri-food sectors. 
As an input to the policy making process, respected 
global modelling databases (e.g., Global Trade Analysis 
Project - GTAP) suffer from a dearth of non-tariff AVE 
information, which renders ex-ante impact assessments 
as rather shallow. Therefore, a second aim of this 
research is to address this shortcoming by proposing 
an alternative ‘indirect gravity’ based method as a 
basis upon which to readily reconcile econometric 
non-tariff AVE estimates with the more aggregated 
degree of sectoral concordance typically found in 
global modelling databases. The study employs a 
panel dataset, whilst additional statistical tests were 
implemented to enhance the reliability of our sector-by-
sector estimates. Rigorous comparisons with relevant 
‘direct gravity’ based AVE estimates show that the 
results are highly comparable.   
Material and methods
Literature review
The estimation of non-tariff trade costs in the 
empirical literature either uses ‘prices’ (domestic and 
foreign) or ‘quantities’ (trade flows), while a further 
sub-classification distinguishes between ‘direct’ 
and ‘indirect’ methods, depending on the respective 
explicit or implicit treatment of the non-tariff indicators 
(see Deardorff & Stern, 1998; Ferrantino, 2006, for 
surveys). A cursory examination of the literature reveals 
that the quantity based method appears to be the more 
popular, in large part due to easy access to detailed 
public databases of trade (Berden & Francois, 2015). 
Examining the price-approach, Bradford (2003, 2005) 
1The TPP involves Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. Interestingly, China is not 
party to these negotiations. In a departure from previous US external trade policy, the current US administration unilaterally pulled out of the TPP.
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calculates (rather than estimates) the implicit non-tariff 
impact on prices (indirect method), whilst Dean et al. 
(2009) and Cadot & Gourdon (2014), employ an explicit 
non-tariff variable (i.e., direct method) to estimate its 
price rising effect.
Direct methods, in both price and quantity approaches, 
employ secondary data sources (both quantitative and 
qualitative) to construct a coverage ratio or dummy 
variable to indicate the degree of pervasiveness or the 
presence of a non-tariff restriction within the commodity 
of interest, which subsequently enters as an explanatory 
variable in an econometric model (price-dependent or 
gravity-type quantity-dependent). To this end, data may 
be taken from inventories of standards and regulations 
(e.g., UNCTAD TRAINS database); notifications to the 
WTO on the implementation of new trade regulations or 
complaints by traders (e.g., WTO World trade Reports). 
In the context of the EU-US trade relations, EP (2014) 
use the SPS and TBT notifications to the WTO to build 
a non-tariff variable that when interacted with the EU-
US and US-EU) route dummy, allows for the direct 
estimation of bilateral AVEs of non-tariff costs. In their 
study, the sample includes a cross-section (year 2012) of 
OECD countries. Unfortunately, these methods neglect 
the relative importance of each measure in restricting 
trade, while countries which are more transparent 
appear as more restrictive (Chen & Novy, 2012). 
Arita et al. (2015) build a non-tariff variable that 
collects the incidence of SPS type measures between 
the EU and US in those cases where official concerns 
have been raised by US and EU exporters. A data sample 
consisting of three years (2010-2012) and a selection of 
countries ranging between 20 and 35 (depending on the 
sector) is constructed to estimate directly the non-tariff 
impact on bilateral trade. The choice of sectors and the 
direction for which the AVE is estimated is contingent 
upon the concern raised (e.g., The EU non-tariff AVE is 
estimated for red and white meat, maize and soy; whilst 
non-tariff AVEs for fruits and vegetables are estimated 
in both directions). In a similar fashion, Winchester et 
al. (2012) narrow the focus to target specific non-tariff 
costs based on exhaustive databases covering (inter 
alia) TBT and SPS, for specific countries and sectors. A 
disadvantage of these databases (both global or tailored) 
is the limited sectorial- and country coverage, whilst 
the data typically refers to only a single year which 
precludes the use of a panel database which, from a pure 
econometric perspective, helps to mitigate endogeneity 
problems. Another method of data extraction employs 
questionnaire responses on traders’ perceptions of 
market access. ECORYS (2009) interacts this non-
tariff score variable with a route dummy (i.e. from 
EU to US and vice versa), which feeds into a standard 
cross-sectional gravity equation, to estimate bilateral 
EU-US non-tariff AVEs for agri-food. This approach 
is potentially open, however, to criticisms of limited 
sample size and response bias.
Two more direct quantity gap studies merit note. 
Owing to its sector (HS6 aggregation) and country 
coverage, Kee et al. (henceforth KNO) (2009) is 
recognised as the most comprehensive source of 
commodity specific non-tariff AVEs. The authors 
employ an aggregate import equation to estimate 
restrictiveness indexes from a dummy variable that 
accounts for the presence of non-tariff barriers (SPS 
and TBT) to trade plus domestic support. A second 
study by Li & Beghin (2012) conducts a meta-analysis 
(27 papers are considered) of direct quantity gap 
estimation methods to explain the variation of trade 
effects of health, safety and sanitary regulations and 
standards. The study considers differences in non-tariff 
measurement, data disaggregation and size, different 
estimation techniques and approaches to deal with zero 
trade values. 
In contrast to the direct approach, which can isolate 
the trade restrictiveness resulting from specific, or 
groups of non-tariff restrictions, the indirect or implicit 
approach is better attuned to examining the collective 
trade restricting impact of all trade barriers which may 
otherwise be hidden (Dean et al., 2009). Thus, indirect 
methods start by acknowledging that trade barriers 
imposed by the importer country cause distortions in 
trade, reducing import quantities (i.e. quantity-gap) 
and/or increasing import prices (i.e. price-gap). Indirect 
quantity approaches infer the non-tariff impact on trade 
flows from ‘border-effects’ (e.g. Chevassus-Lozza et 
al., 2008), ‘fixed-effects’ (Fontagné et al., 2011), or 
from the depth of past trade agreements (Egger et al., 
2015). As an alternative indirect approach, the ‘residual 
gravity approach’ infers the non-tariff impact on trade 
from the residuals by comparing the value of observed 
imports constrained by trade barriers, with the expected 
value of imports in the absence of said trade barriers 
predicted by the gravity equation (Ferrantino, 2006).
The residual approach has been more extensively 
applied in services sectors (e.g., Park, 2002; Francois et 
al., 2005; Guillin, 2013), as the direct method requires 
extensive databases on regulatory regimes on services 
which have not, hitherto, been available (Jafari & Tarr, 
2014). On the other hand, in the area of merchandise 
trade, this method has been applied to agri-food 
(Philippidis & Sanjuán, 2007a, 2007b), whilst the 
IMF (2002) have used this same approach to estimate 
the trade restricting effect of all non-tariff barriers in 
order to calculate ‘trade potentials’ for certain groups 
of countries. Following this same approach EP (2014) 
also calculate the trade potential between the EU and 
US after eliminating all possible trade barriers. 
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A comparison between both direct and indirect 
approach shows that the former provides a statistical 
assessment of the impact of non-tariff impediments to 
trade through examination of the dummy coefficient. 
Although this is not as straightforward in the indirect 
approach (Dean et al., 2009), it is still possible (see next 
section). A further observation when inferring trade 
costs (i.e., AVEs) using quantities, is the sensitivity 
of the AVE estimate to the value of the chosen import 
demand elasticity and/or elasticity of substitution. The 
direct price gap approach gets round this problem, 
as it allows the direct estimation of the impact of 
non-tariff impediments on prices. Finally, direct and 
indirect econometric approaches are susceptible to 
misspecification bias (e.g., omitted variable bias), 
whilst it has been suggested that the accuracy of the 
non-tariff calculation in the residuals-gravity approach 
is potentially even more contingent upon the estimation 
technique and the quality of the model specification 
On the other hand, AVEs derived from non-tariff 
dummy variables depend crucially on the quality of 
the measurement of the non-tariff impediment under 
consideration (Ferrantino, 2006).
As stated in the introduction, an important aim of this 
research is to provide a platform upon which compatible 
measures of non-tariff trade costs may be implemented 
into modelling databases as a basis for conducting global 
trade impact analyses. To this end, the GTAP database 
is chosen with its broad, yet comprehensive, coverage 
of agri-food trade. Having taken the decision to employ 
this level of aggregation, we effectively rule out the use 
of non-tariff specific dummies, since at the GTAP sector 
concordance, at least one NTM will always be present, 
thereby resulting in a limited variability of observations2.
Consequently, an indirect or residual quantity gap 
approach was favoured, whilst the approach adopted here 
is ‘specific’, in that it estimates non-tariff impediments to 
trade on a bilateral basis differentiating between intra- and 
extra-EU (i.e., EU-US) trade routes. To provide statistical 
rigour often lacking in the indirect method (see discussion 
above), confidence intervals for bilateral non-tariff trade 
cost equivalents were calculated by bootstrapping, 
whilst pairwise t-tests for means were applied to test for 
statistically different AVEs across bilateral routes.  
Model specification, data and estimation
In its simplest form, the gravity model posits that 
trade between two countries is a positive function of 
GDP (i.e., ‘mass’) and a negative function of trade 
costs (i.e., distance). Empirical applications have 
extended this basic premise to encompass (inter alia) 
preferential trade (e.g., Hayakawa & Yamashita, 2011), 
contiguity (e.g., Thoumi, 1989), common language and/
or ex-colonial ties (e.g., Rose & van Wincoop, 2001), 
or even to cater for the effect of distance along different 
hemispheres as well as remoteness (e.g., Melitz, 2007). 
Other developments (e.g., Hallack, 2006) account for the 
so called ‘Linder’ (1961) hypothesis, which states that 
countries with similar per capita incomes have a greater 
tendency to engage in mutual trade. This is seen as a 
test of the monopolistic intra-industry hypothesis, whilst 
the polar opposite that differences in per capita incomes 
(which proxy for differing factor intensities) promote 
trade can be interpreted as support for the Hecksher-
Ohlin (HO) hypothesis. This framework has also been 
extended to account for the role of infrastructure (Limão 
& Venables, 2001; Donaubauer et al., 2016) and logistics 
performance indicators (Martí et al., 2014).
The general theoretically-consistent gravity equation 
derived by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003, 2004) is 
formulated as follows:
     [1]
where Xij are exports from country i to country j; Yi and 
Yj represent GDP, Yw is world GDP, tij are trade costs 
i.e. tij = 1 + τij where  is an ‘iceberg cost’ imposed by 
country j on imports originating from country i; and 
σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties 
(i.e. countries). The price index variables Пi and Pj, 
denominated as ‘multilateral resistance’ terms, are a 
function of bilateral trade barriers (tij), and reflect the 
level of difficulty for country ‘i’ to engage in trade 
with country ‘j’, taking into account their bilateral 
trade barrier relative to the average trade barriers that 
both countries face with all their trading partners. 
Empirically, these unobserved terms are proxied with 
country specific dummies (Anderson & van Wincoop, 
2004). Furthermore, provided that these variables do 
not change over the time horizon of the data, country-
fixed effects may also capture consumers’ preferences 
in the importing country or the number of varieties in 
the exporting country (Disdier et al., 2008).
In this study, a class of Poisson3 gravity model was 
favoured (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2011) known 
as the Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PML)4 estimator 
2 A possible alternative would be to employ a proportion index based on the share of NTM affected HS6 lines within each GTAP sector, although even 
in this case, existing databases (i.e., TRAINS) do not provide a complete picture for all countries. In this respect, the EP (2014) study reports that 100% 
of the HS6 agricultural and food product lines are affected by at least one NTM in OCDE countries, and accordingly, a direct NTM-dummy approach is 
confounded with the importer fixed effect.
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(Gourieroux et al., 1984).  The model assumes that the 
observed volume of trade between countries i and j, Xij 
follows a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean 
(µij) which is an exponential function of the explanatory 
variables z: μij = exp(β’zij)5.
Time series trade data were obtained from UN 
ComTrade database (http://comtrade.un.org/), which has 
been widely used in the literature (Burger et al., 2009; 
Fadeyi et al., 2014; Serrano et al., 2015). Thus, annual 
HS6 bilateral import trade values for the years 2001 to 
2011, and 78 countries was collected and reconciled with 
the GTAP nomenclature of 18 agri-food sectors (Table 
1) using WITS concordances (World Integrated Trade 
Solutions by WTO [http://wits.worldbank.org/wits]).6 
Data on ad-valorem applied tariffs were taken from 
versions six (Dimaranan, 2006), seven (Narayanan & 
Walmsley, 2008), eight (Narayanan et al., 2012) and nine 
of the GTAP database corresponding to the years 2001, 
2004, 2007 and 2011, respectively. Population and GDP 
were from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2014), 
whilst data for cultural and geographical proximities 
was taken from CEPII (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).
Based on a review of the literature, a comprehensive 
gravity specification is formulated, and a full description 
of the variables is presented in Table 2. The explanatory 
variables of infrastructure and logistics were finally 
discarded owing to their incomplete country and/or 
temporal coverage from the available sources of data7. 
The Poisson regression model with an exponential mean 
function is presented in Eq. [2]8, where the sub-index i 
and j refer to the exporter and importer, respectively, 
whilst t refers to the year:
                                                           
                                                                                
Calculating trade barrier ad-valorem equivalents
In the indirect quantity gravity approach, discrepancies 
between actual (AXij, i.e. variable Xij in Eqs. [1] and 
[2]) and predicted (PXij, i.e. E[Xij] in Eq. [2]) values 
of trade are taken to be indicative of trade barriers, as 
the prediction by the gravity equation is assumed to 
reflect potential trade after controlling for observed 
trade frictions. Given that applied tariffs are included 
explicitly in the model, trade barriers implied by the 
residuals are considered to be due to non-tariff barriers. 
Thus, the trade cost tij in Eq. [1] (after controlling for 
observed trade frictions) is assumed to reflect the NTMs:
                                                                                
                                                                                [3]
where  is the AVE of all the NTMs imposed by 
country j on imports originating from country i.
Following Park (2002) and Francois et al. (2005), 
the AVEs are calculated by trading partner averaged 
over all import routes. Thus, in this study, for each 
country j, actual and predicted imports were summed 
over all its trade partners:  and 
 (in our application N<=78). In 
order to quantify the magnitude of the trade barriers, 
we also followed the aforementioned authors by 
normalizing each observed-to-predicted trade ratio 
with a benchmark of the largest ratio of observed-to-
predicted trade, which is interpreted as a ‘relative free-
trade benchmark’ ratio (AXb/PXb)9.
Solving for the AVE of non-tariff measures ( ) 
imposed by country j:
                                                                           
                                                                                [4]
In the current study, the interest lies in the specific 
non-tariff restrictions between the EU and US (i.e., 
intra-EU; EU to US; US to EU), which in turn, requires 
a modification of Eq. [4]. For example, for EU imports 
of US goods, the AVE becomes:
                                                          
                                                                                  [5]
3  The Poisson estimator maintains the model in its multiplicative theoretical form (see Eq. [1]), thereby avoiding the coefficient bias within the log-linear 
transformation – the functional representation of Eq. [1] when employing Ordinary Least Squares (ECORYS, 2009), or the second stage of a Heckman 
approach (EP, 2014).
4  Even when the dependent variable is not pure count, as it is the case of trade observations, the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator still provides 
consistent estimates (Woolridge, 2002).
5  See Cameron & Trivedi (1998) for a detailed discussion of count models.
6  The GTAP sectors of raw milk and raw sugar were discarded since they are classed as non tradables. The full list of 78 countries is available from the 
authors upon request.
7  In particular, the coverage of the World Bank databases is limited. Thus, the length of railways is only available from 2006 onwards; data on paved roads 
is no longer publicly available; and the Logistics Performance Index is based on bi-annual surveys, starting from 2007. 
8  As a first step, we tested for possible endogeneity between tariffs and import volumes (i.e., bilateral trade may explain bilateral import tariffs). Since the 
Wu-Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis that tariffs are exogenous [F (1, 394,447) = 0.220, p = 0.642], the subsequent analysis was conducted 
without taking into account instruments.
9 Thus, by construction, the ad valorem trade cost is zero in the country that acts as the benchmark or reference point.
[2]
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where adds up observed (predicted) 
imports coming from the US to any country in the EU: 
(k=number of Member States in the EU).10 Sectoral 
substitution elasticities (σ) across importing sources in 
[4] and [5] were taken from the GTAP database (Hertel 
et al., 2007) and Kee et al. (2008).11 In addition to the 
point estimates, confidence intervals for bilateral non-
tariff trade cost equivalents were calculated.12
Results
The estimation of Eq. [2] was carried out on a sector-
by-sector basis. Owing to considerations of space, further 
results can be found in the supplementary material 
(Table S1). Comparing with the relevant literature, 
the fit of the models, and parameter estimates were 
broadly in line with a priori expectations, exhibiting 
an acceptable level of statistical significance, whilst the 
relative magnitudes across explanatory variables were 
also consistent with previous studies. 
In this section, several diagnostic comparisons were 
conducted to assess the plausibility of our non-tariff 
restriction estimates. First we compared non-tariff 
AVE estimates from relevant price- and quantity-gap 
studies in the literature. Secondly, estimated intra- and 
extra-EU non-tariff restrictions were compared, whilst 
additional match-ups were made with corresponding 
applied tariff AVEs from the GTAP database. Of 
particular interest we tested the a priori hypotheses 
(i) that harmonised ‘single market’ product standards 
and controls result in lower intra-EU non-tariff AVE 
estimates and (ii) that non-tariff restrictions are more 
trade prohibitive compared with traditional tariff 
measures. 
10  The composition of the EU changes over the sample period, being composed of 15 members prior to 2004, 25 countries between 2004 and 2006, and 
27 from 2007 to 2011. Accordingly, the formula in [5] was calculated for each year in the sample, whilst the final estimate is the average.
11  GTAP trade substitution elasticities were employed in the case of 'pdr' and 'ctl', owing to the abnormally low and high elasticity values, respectively, 
estimated by KNO.
12  In particular, following Cameron & Trivedi (2010, Chapter 13) a non-parametric bootstrap-pair method was employed (i.e. both explanatory and 
dependent variable values are resampled together with replacement), clustered (i.e. resampling assumes independence of clusters of observations, where 
the cluster is defined by each pair of trade partners) and with, initially, 1000 replications. For each bootstrapped sample, the Poisson model was re-es-
timated which provided the necessary input to recalculate the bilateral AVE in Eq. [5]. Percentile bias-corrected (BC) confidence intervals were then 
computed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The analysis was carried out employing STATA v.13.
Table 1. Description of the 18 agri-food sectors
Code Name of the sector Definition
pdr Paddy rice Rice, husked and unhusked
wht Wheat Soft and durum wheat
gro Other cereal grains Rye, sorghum, barley, oats, maize, millet and other cereals
v_f Vegetables, fruits and nuts All vegetables, fruits and nuts
osd Oilseeds Oilseeds and oleaginous fruits
pfb Plant based fibers Raw vegetable materials used in textiles; seeds, live plants
ocr Other Crops Other crops
ctl Cattle Live bovine cattle, sheep and goats for fattening, horses, asses, mules
oap Other animal products Live swine and poultry for fattening, other animals; eggs, honey, snails and frogs legs
wol Wool and silk-worm cocoons Wool and silk worm cocoons
cmt Meat of cattle Meat of cattle, sheep, goats and horses
omt Other meat products Meat of swine, edible offal
vol Vegetable oils and fats Oils of: Coconuts, cottonseeds, groundnuts, oilseeds, olives, palm ker-
nels, rice brans, rape and mustard, soyabeans, sunflower seeds; and fats
mil Dairy products All dairy products
pcr Processed rice Milled rice
sgr Sugar Refined sugar, sweeteners
ofd Other food products Prepared and preserved sea food products, vegetables and fruits, bakery 
and confectionary products, pastas and flours
b_t Beverages and tobacco products Cigarettes, cigars, wines and spirits, beer
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Comparing country- and sector-specific AVE 
estimates with the literature
Making comparisons with existing literature is 
complicated by the choice of sectorial and country 
aggregation, the estimation procedure, the quantification 
method and years of reference in the sample. Using 
WTO (World Integrated Trade Solutions-WITS) 
concordances between GTAP and HS6 codes, KNO 
(2009) arithmetic average AVEs for agricultural and 
food imports by GTAP sector were calculated (columns 
3 and 6, Table 3) based on a sample of 61 countries 
which are common to both KNO and the current study.13 
The current study employed Eq. [4] to calculate country 
non-tariff AVEs which were later averaged for each 
GTAP sector (columns 2 and 5, Table 3). 
Examining Table 3, our average estimate (second 
column) for both the agri-food and agricultural 
composites (25% and 30%, respectively) were very 
similar to the corresponding KNO estimates (31% and 
25% - third column), whilst in the case of the aggregate 
food processing sector, the results were also broadly 
comparable (20% vs 34% - columns 5 and 6). On a 
sector-by-sector basis, KNO estimates for processed 
food products (except beverages and tobacco) were 
higher than those reported with our approach, while 
our estimates for agricultural products were higher 
in six out of ten sectors. In almost half of the sectors 
13 The full list of countries and calculations are available upon request from the authors.
Table 2. Variable descriptions in the Gravity equation 
Variable Description
Xijt Value of imports into country j from country i at current prices in year t (million US$)
Mtijt
Power of the import tariff rate (AdvRateijt) applied by importer j on imports from i in year t, measured in 
ad-valorem equivalents, in logs:
Distij Weighted bilateral distance by internal population, between the main cities of country i and j, in logs
DistIntj Internal distance of country j, calculated as 0.67  , in logs
NoSoij Difference in latitudes between countries i and j, in logs: ln(abs(latitudei – latitudej))
Remoteit
Indicator of remoteness of country i in year t, calculated as a GDP weighted average of distance to the 
countries with which country i trades:
where Distij is the distance between i and j (defined as above), GDPWt is the world GDP in year t, and T(i) 
is the number of the destination countries of exports from i.
Locki Dummy variable that values 1 when country i is landlocked, and 0 otherwise.
Contigij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share a border, and 0 otherwise
Langij
Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j share the same language (at least 9% of the popula-
tion speaks it), and 0 otherwise
Colij Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j have or have had a colonial linkage
PTAijt
Dummy variable that values 1 when countries i and j belong to the same Preferential Trade Area. PTA in-
cludes EU, EFTA, NAFTA, CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), Mercosur (Southern Cone 
Common Market), Andean Community, Caricom (Caribbean Community and Common Market), CACM 
(Central American Common Market) and ASEAN (Asean Free Trade Area).
Sqincomeijt
Square of the difference in per capita income in countries i and j, in logs: ln((GDPpcit – GDPpcjt)2) with 
GDPpc measured in US$ per habitant  (in nominal terms)
Gdpijt 
Product of GDP in country i and country j in year t, in logs: ln(GDPit × GDPjt), with GDP measured in 
million US $ (in nominal terms)
Yt
Fixed effect for each year t (t= 2002 to 2011), i.e., a dummy variable that values 1 when the year is t, and 
0 otherwise.
Fi (Fj)
Fixed effects for exporter (importer) country i (j). Fi(Fj) are dummy variables, that value 1 when the ex-
porter (importer) is i (j), and 0 otherwise
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examined, the gap in mean AVE estimates between 
both approaches was less than 10 percentage points, 
with a minimum difference of 5 percentage points for 
fruits and vegetables and beverages and tobacco. In 
the case of food processing, the largest difference can 
be found in processed rice (110% versus our estimate 
of 28%). In agriculture, the main differences occured 
in plant based fibres (18% versus our estimate of 
82%). 
As a further basis of comparison, Table 4 compares 
our country specific estimates (columns 2 and 6) from 
Eq. (4) with two quantity gap studies (KNO, 2009; 
EP, 2014) and the price gap approach of Bradford 
(2003). In the case of agriculture, our non-tariff 
AVE estimate for the US and EU-27 was 27% and 
29%, respectively. This is broadly compatible with 
corresponding estimates of 22% and 27% in KNO and 
33% and 44% in EP (2014). Across the same three 
quantity gap studies, the divergence was higher for 
processed food, where KNO estimates were placed 
around the midpoint between the lower values in the 
current study and upper values of EP (2014). Despite 
the use of a different methodology, EU non-tariff AVE 
estimates in Bradford (2003) converged closely with 
the three quantity gap studies, whilst in common with 
our results Bradford (2003) concludes that agricultural 
non-tariff restrictions are more prohibitive than those 
of food in both the EU and US. Remarkably, all 
four studies conclude that ‘behind the border’ trade 
costs in the EU are more prohibitive than those of 
the US, although this finding is not consistent with 
non-tariff estimates of ‘food processing’ reported by 
OECD (2011) (30.1% and 49.5%, for EU and US, 
respectively).14
Bilateral (EU-US) non-tariff AVE estimates
In a next step, Eq. [5] was employed to calculate 
non-tariff AVEs on intra-EU and trans-Atlantic trade 
in both directions (Table 5). The point AVE estimates 
reported here for (trade weighted) agri-food imports 
to the EU from the US (35%) and to the US from the 
EU (27%) are lower than those reported by ECORYS 
(2009) (56.8% and 73.3%, respectively). Apart from 
the different sectorial coverage and disaggregation, 
differences in results are also attributed to the choice 
of data, econometric estimator and modelling approach. 
Our estimates are more in line with those of EP 
(2014). Thus, examining the simple average agri-food 
estimates in our study, we estimated AVEs of 47% 
and 39% for the EU and US, respectively, compared 
with corresponding estimates in EP(2014) of 54% and 
48%.15 Encouragingly, across the three bilateral routes, 
AVE point estimates for the ‘agri-food’ aggregate 
moved within the range of 17% to 35% (Table 5), 
which is more in line with the value of 31% reported 
by KNO (see Table 3).  In addition, our AVE point 
estimates for extra-EU imports were 38% (agriculture) 
14  It should be noted that the aggregate NTM estimates for the EU in Table 4 from our study also reflected intra-EU trade which is typically characterised 
by lower NTM trade costs (see the following subsection).
15 The calculations were based on the simple average of the AVEs for 14 agri-food sectors reported in Table 2.9 of EP (2014).
Table 3. Comparison of ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) of aggregate NTMs by sector
AVE a KNO AVE b AVE a KNO AVE b
Agri-food   0.25 c 0.31d
Agriculture 0.30 0.25d Food 0.20   0.34 d
pdr 0.32 0.26 cmt 0.24 0.42
wht 0.40 0.16 omt 0.16 0.26
gro 0.14 0.27 vol 0.13 0.34
v_f 0.26 0.31 mil 0.23 0.51
osd 0.33 0.25 pcr 0.28 1.10
pfb 0.82 0.18 sgr 0.17 0.29
ocr 0.16 0.23 ofd 0.12 0.35
ctl 0.13 0.31 b_t 0.25 0.20
oap 0.26 0.17
wol 0.13 0.03
a Estimates using the indirect residual approach. Averages across 61 countries common to the KNO (2009) database. b Own calculations 
based on KNO (2009) database, using both, Core NTB and Agricultural Domestic Support. GTAP sectoral figures were obtained averaging 
original AVEs for HS6 sectors and individual (61) countries. Calculus based only on Core NTB did not change the reported values substan-
tially. c Simple average over GTAP sectoral averages. d Simple average over original HS6 sectors and individual countries.
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and 32% (food), which compares favourably with the 
corresponding extra-EU estimates by KNO (Table 4) of 
27% and 40%. A similar observation is true for the US’s 
imports.
Examining intra-EU trade for primary agricultural 
commodities (Table 5), the trade weighted AVE 
mean estimate was 23%. Moreover, individual sector 
estimates ranged between 15% and 19% in the broad 
(heterogeneous) sectors of ‘other crops’ and ‘other 
grains’, to 48% in ‘cattle and sheep’ and 63% in ‘plant 
based fibres’ (Table 5), whilst in the case of intra-
EU processed food trade, the AVEs were of a lesser 
magnitude and more homogeneous in magnitude across 
sectors. On trans-Atlantic trade routes, the US was 
estimated to impose AVEs as high as 91%, 82% and 
71% on imports of ‘cattle meat’, ‘plant based fibres’ 
and ‘dairy’, respectively. In turn, the EU AVE peaks 
were apparent on imports of ‘dairy’ (90%), ‘cattle meat’ 
(71%) and ‘pig/poultry meat’ (63%).
Comparing across the three bilateral routes, with the 
exceptions of ‘oilseeds’, ‘cattle’ ‘wool’, and ‘beverages 
and tobacco’, the AVE was found to be lowest on the 
intra-EU trade route (as expected). In addition, in those 
sectors where US non-tariff AVEs are deemed higher 
than their EU equivalents (i.e., ‘cattle meat’, ‘processed 
sugar’ and ‘processed rice’), with the exception of the 
latter, the result was found to be statistically significant. 
In the case of ‘vegetables and fruit’, despite the close 
AVE estimates of 35-36% in both directions, a t-test 
of the mean bootstrapped values revealed that the US 
AVE was higher; a result supported by the higher upper 
limit within the US confidence interval (see below). 
In the majority of sectors (14), the results appeared to 
indicate that EU AVEs are equally or more prohibitive 
than those of the US, which further supports the 
observation made at the end of the previous section 
(Table 4). On the other hand, pair-wise t-tests showed 
that this finding is only supported statistically in eight 
of those sectors (i.e., ‘other grains’, ‘oilseeds’, ‘plant 
based fibres’, ‘other crops’, ‘white meat’, ‘vegetable 
oils’, ‘dairy’, ‘beverages and tobacco’). Moreover, 
when testing for differences in the trade weighted AVE 
means on trans-Atlantic routes for agriculture, food 
and agri-food categories, no statistical difference was 
found. Interestingly, EP (2014) also reports this same 
finding.
The calculation of confidence intervals helped to 
capture the degree of certainty behind the AVE point 
estimates over a time period of the sample. Inspecting the 
results in Table 5, EU AVE point estimates, particularly 
on intra-EU trade, exhibited greater accuracy than 
those of the US. On closer inspection of the data, there 
were cases of small import trade flows (owing to high 
self-sufficiency) accompanied by significant import 
volatility (particularly on (inter alia) ‘other grains’ and 
‘processed sugar’ trade from the EU to the US), whilst 
in other sectors (e.g., vegetable oils and fats trade from 
the EU to the US) the presence of a structural break 
was observed relating to an array of indeterminate 
sector specific events (i.e., weather shocks, agricultural 
policies, data aggregation). 
Comparing between (trade weighted) non-tariff and 
tariff AVE’s on EU-US bilateral trade (Table 5), for the 
selection of agri-food products under consideration 
(with one exception16), NTMs (as expected) were found 
to be more trade prohibitive on trans-Atlantic imports in 
16 In the case of EU imports of US processed sugar, the NTM and tariff AVEs are 13% and 19%, respectively.
Table 4. Comparison of ad-valorem equivalents (AVE) of NTMs by country
Agriculture Food
AVE
KNO 
AVEa
Bradford 
AVE b
EP 
AVE c
AVE KNO AVEa
Bradford 
AVEb
EP 
AVE c
Australia 0.24 0.30 0.07 na 0.20 0.53 0.09 na
Canada 0.29 0.24 0.11 na 0.19 0.22 0.20 na
Japan 0.27 0.27 0.58 na 0.19 0.40 1.10 na
US 0.27 0.22 0.16 0.33 0.19 0.31 0.10 0.53
EU-15 0.28 0.33 0.35 --- 0.19 0.50 0.33 ---
EU-27 0.29 0.27 --- 0.44 0.19 0.40 --- 0.64
a Own calculations based on KNO (2009) database, using both, Core NTB and Agricultural Domestic Support. Simple averages across 
HS6 sectors (and countries in EU aggregates). Due to country coverage, EU-15 does not include Luxembourg, and EU-27, Luxem-
bourg, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Malta and Slovakia. b Own calculations based on Bradford (2003, Table 2). EU-15 based on results 
reported for Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and UK (simple average). Agriculture includes fisheries and forestry, and Food excludes 
beverages and tobacco. Adding AVEs of fisheries and forestry to Agriculture weighting by trade, led to small changes in comparison to 
the figures reported in column 5. c Own calculations based on EP (2014, Table 2.9). na: non-available.
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both directions. For aggregate agricultural imports, the 
tariff and non-tariff AVEs for the EU (US) were 3% and 
38%, (2% and 30%), respectively. In the case of food, 
the corresponding estimates were 13% and 32% (2% 
and 27%), respectively. This finding reinforces the view 
expressed in the introduction that non-tariff restrictions 
have replaced tariffs as the dominant form of (agri-
food) trade protectionism.
Discussion
From a policy perspective, the credibility of bilateral 
non-tariff AVE estimates is very much a function of 
the sector under analysis. In both meat sectors, the 
relatively high non-tariff AVEs are entirely consistent 
with rigorous control standards and even import 
restrictions imposed by both the EU and US.  In the 
case of ‘cattle meat’, high non-tariff AVEs in both 
partners is perhaps to be expected given EU import 
quota regulation, heavy SPS regulatory barriers and 
the retaliatory history of trade in this sector. Indeed, 
on the latter point, the long serving EU restriction on 
cattle meat treated with growth promoting hormones 
has been met by US sanctions on EU origin beef. It is 
only more recently, within the TTIP negotiations that 
the EU agreed to authorise the US’s use of lactic acid 
in meat preparations. 
Table 5. NTM AVE estimates and AVE Tariffs for bilateral trade EU-US (95% confidence interval in parentheses)1,2,3
Sector EU→EU US→EU EU→US
NTM NTM Tariff 5 NTM Tariff 5
Agriculture
(trade weighted mean)4 0.23
 a (0.18, 0.27) 0.38 b (0.33, 0.43) 0.03 0.30 ab (0.22, 0.38) 0.02
pdr  0.22 (na) 0.39 (na) 0.21 0.36 (na) 0.01
wht 0.29 a (0.27, 0.29) 0.41 b (0.34, 0.49) 0.12 0.39 b (0.00, 0.61) 0.01
gro 0.19 a (0.13, 0.32) 0.36 b (0.22, 0.38) 0.01 0.33 c (0.23,0.80 ) 0.00
v_f 0.22 a (0.19, 0.22) 0.35 b (0.20, 0.44) 0.03 0.36 c (0.12, 0.57) 0.02
osd 0.33 a (0.21, 0.41) 0.42 b (0.27, 0.53) 0.00 0.16 c (0.00, 0.40) 0.00
pfb 0.63 a (0.48, 0.74) 1.33 b (0.89, 1.89) 0.00 0.82 c (0.10, 1.49) 0.00
ocr 0.15 a (0.15, 0.18) 0.30 b (0.18, 0.46) 0.06 0.23 c (0.18, 0.32) 0.03
ctl 0.48 a (0.41, 0.55) 0.35 b (0.03, 0.42) 0.03 0.34 b (0.11, 0.45) 0.03
oap 0.24 (na) 0.54 (na) 0.02 0.44 (na) 0.00
wol  0.26 (na) 0.31 (na ) 0.00 0.17 ( na) 0.01
Food 
(trade weighted mean)4 0.15
 a (0.10, 0.19) 0.32 b (0.25, 0.38) 0.13 0.27 b (0.17, 0.36) 0.02
cmt 0.20 a (0.18, 0.21) 0.71 b (0.50, 0.97) 0.64 0.91 c (0.39, 1.92) 0.01
omt 0.13 a (0.11, 0.13) 0.63 b (0.45, 0.78) 0.15 0.24 c (0.10, 0.47 ) 0.01
vol 0.10 a (0.10, 0.10) 0.46 b (0.30, 0.54) 0.03 0.38 c (0.16, 0.79) 0.01
mil 0.18 a (0.16, 0.18) 0.90 b (0.48, 1.17) 0.47 0.71 c (0.46, 1.17) 0.12
pcr 0.20 (na) 0.33 (na) 0.21 0.44 (na) 0.04
sgr 0.13a (0.11, 0.13) 0.13 b (0.00, 0.25) 0.19 0.31 c (0.10, 0.44) 0.12
ofd 0.11 (0.09, 0.12) 0.27 b (0.17, 0.36) 0.13 0.27 b (0.17, 0.36) 0.04
b_t 0.21a (0.16, 0.31) 0.33 b (0.18, 0.60) 0.06 0.21 a (0.16, 0.32) 0.01
Agric + Food
(trade weighted mean)4 0.17
 a (0.12, 0.21) 0.35 b (0.30, 0.40) 0.08 0.27 b 0.18, 0.35) 0.02
1 AVEs based on KNO (2008) elasticities of substitution, with the exception of ‘pdr’ and ´ctl´, where the GTAP elasticity is used.  2 
95% confidence interval (CI) (percentile bias corrected) using bootstrap. Although the initial number of replications was 1000, model 
convergence failure reduced the actual number to a range between 400 and 800, depending on the sector, with a mean of 500. For agri-
culture and food aggregates the CI was based on a t-student distribution.  3 Pairwise t-tests for the means across different bilateral routes 
used bootstrapped coefficients. Means within a row with different letters a,b,c are significantly different at 1%.  4 Weighted average by 
mean trade values in the sample period, 2001-2011.  5 Calculated from version 9 of the GTAP database.  na: non-available
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In the pig/poultry meat sector, the finding that the EU 
imposes higher non-tariff costs may be partly explained 
by its ban on the use of pathogen reduction treatments 
of poultry carcasses. Moreover, there has been ongoing 
concern within the EU regarding the compulsory usage 
of origin labelling and traceability for fresh and frozen 
poultry meat, which presents an important additional 
trade cost.17 In addition, the AVE estimate presented 
here (63%) for white meat trade from the US to EU 
coincides with the lowest estimate for pork reported by 
Arita et al. (2015). On the other hand, the EP (2014) 
estimate for white meat (82%) is closer to our upper 
limit (78%). 
In the live ‘cattle’ (principally live bovine, ovine and 
equine) and ‘other animal products’ (principally live 
swine and poultry) sectors, the high AVEs reported for 
both partners (Table 5) are compatible with significant 
transport costs related to the application of mandatory 
requirements governing animal welfare. The result for 
‘ctl’ concurs with the estimates from EP (2014) (38% 
and 22% in the EU and US, respectively), both of which 
fall within our confidence interval. Notwithstanding, 
in live cattle, there is an apparently counter-intuitive 
result that the intra-EU bootstrapped estimate (48% - 
Table 6) is statistically higher than the extra-EU and US 
import equivalents. In any case, it remains unclear as to 
whether significant live animal trade would occur under 
a hypothetical TTIP agreement.
On dairy trade, the twenty percentage point 
gap reported in Table 5 between the US and EU 
is questionable, despite the statistically significant 
difference in bootstrapped means. On the other hand, 
our point estimates reported in Table 5 are remarkably 
close to those in EP (2014) (92% and 68% for EU 
and US, respectively). On both sides of the Atlantic, a 
system of dairy tariff rate quotas (TRQs) is imposed, 
whilst it is true that the EU imposes considerable 
administrative burdens relating to (inter alia) milk 
quality requisites (somatic cell counts), and the usage 
of geographic indicators (i.e., parmesan, feta etc.) 
(USDEC, 2013). Notwithstanding, interstate sales 
of EU origin pasteurised milk products (known as 
‘Grade A’ milk produce) are heavily complicated by 
numerous rules of compliance with US regulations. In 
its qualitative survey, ECORYS (2009) classifies these 
non-tariff restrictions as highly prohibitive to EU sales, 
which explains why the EU sought after an acceptance 
of equivalence in order to permit exports of EU Grade 
A milk produce to the US. In addition, from 2011 
onwards, the Dairy Promotion Program (DPP) in the 
US has levied an additional charge on imported dairy 
products, which in turn finances promotion, education 
and research programs, although it remains unclear as to 
whether this measure benefits imported dairy products.
The fruit and vegetable market in both partners is 
also subject to strict quality control programs. This is 
reflected by notable AVE estimates on both sides, whilst 
the US AVE is found to be statistically higher, as noted 
above. Importantly, our AVEs are comparable to the 
estimates in Arita et al. (2015, Table 11, pp20) for fruits 
and vegetables. EU imports from third countries must 
comply with the harmonisation of maximum residue 
limits for pesticides and strict requirements regarding 
traceability, whilst the US also imposes stringent 
inspection programs. For example, the US Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 establishes different 
marketing orders of particular relevance to fruits and 
vegetables (TRALAC, 2010). 
On cereals trade, the point estimates for wheat are 
statistically the same, whilst for ‘other grains’, EU 
non-tariff restrictions were found to be more trade 
prohibitive. In the latter case, this result is perhaps not 
surprising, since US exports of ‘other grains’ to the 
EU (principally maize) are subject to strict monitoring 
for genetic modifications (USTR, 2007), whilst the 
EU imposes a TRQ scheme on grain imports. On EU 
imports of wheat, EU tolerance limits on mytoxins 
are lower than in the US which could be a significant 
hindrance to US exporters.18 For its part, US policy 
bestows significant behind the border competitive 
advantages to cereal producers in the form of marketing 
assistance, storage facility loans and insurance subsidies 
(TRALAC, 2010). In the case of oilseeds trade, the 
EU non-tariff AVE is considerably higher than the US 
equivalent which is consistent with the EU’s adherence 
to stringent GM regulations on imports of soybeans and 
linseeds. 
The fact that the quantitative results suggest that the 
US is the more prohibitive on imports of processed 
rice and sugar is also open to debate. The non-tariff 
restrictions on both sides reflect, in part, the quantitative 
restrictions under the tariff-rate-quota regime for both 
commodities. On the other hand, the EU once again 
imposes further controls on its GM sugar and rice 
17  Based on the willingness of the US chicken and pork industries to adapt to EU production standards, it has been suggested (Arita et al., 2014), that a 
relaxation of the EU’s tariff rate quota scheme would perhaps not have such a significant impact on US chicken exports, whilst in the pork sector, a clear 
rise in exports could be expected
18  This also affects US exports of almonds and peanuts in the GTAP aggregate, 'vegetables, fruits and nuts'.
19  A genetically modified strain of rice known as LibertyLink rice was developed by an eventual parent company known as Bayer CropScience. The rice 
was genetically modified to be tolerant to glufosinate, the active ingredient in Liberty herbicide, although in 2006 it was discovered that trial tests of this 
rice had contaminated the US rice supply.
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imports, particularly in the case of the latter.19 Finally, 
on beverages and tobacco trade, the US imposes 
severe cross state retailing and distribution red tape 
restrictions on EU products (ECORYS, 2009), whilst 
the geographical indicator (particularly for wine) which 
receives much attention within the EU, is not given 
due consideration by US authorities. As a caveat, one 
should exercise caution when interpreting a single 
non-tariff AVE estimate for this broad sector (i.e., soft 
drinks; alcohol, wines, spirits and tobacco etc.). Similar 
caution should also apply in the case of the ‘other food’ 
processing estimates.
Conclusions
The year 2013 signalled the opening of negotiations 
between the world’s two largest trading partners, the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US). 
Unfortunately, conventional impact studies are ill 
equipped to assess the potential economic gains due 
to the lack of any coherent and consistent database 
relating to non-tariff restrictions. Indeed, unlike 
conventional tariff measures, non-tariff impediments 
to trade do not have a transparent price effect which 
can be readily inserted into an economic model and 
consequently there is uncertainty in policy circles 
regarding the real trade cost of ‘behind the border’ 
measures. 
To empirically answer this question, the gravity model 
has received recognition as a vehicle for understanding 
the trade restrictive impact of non-tariff measures. To 
complement and deepen previous gravity studies in the 
literature, this study provides comprehensive bilateral 
EU-US non-tariff ad valorem equivalent (AVE) 
estimates for 18 disaggregated agriculture and food 
activities. Indeed, in comparison with ECORYS (2009) 
and EP (2014), it takes further steps either in terms of 
the methodological approach adopted; or the level of 
agri-food sectoral coverage; or the decomposition of 
NTM AVE estimates by intra-EU and trans-Atlantic 
bilateral trade routes. As a means to providing accessible 
non-tariff AVE estimates compatible with the typically 
more aggregated sectoral concordance found in global 
modelling databases, this explorative research proposes 
an ‘indirect’ gravity approach. 
As an initial conclusion, the magnitudes of the non-
tariff AVEs estimated for both partners suggests that 
in the ‘cornerstone’ sectors of (inter alia) meat, dairy, 
cereals and vegetables and fruit, substantial trade led 
opportunities and threats could emerge if, under the 
auspices of the TTIP, both partners arrive at a common 
terms of reference for the harmonisation of 'behind 
the border' measures. In an attempt to further assess 
the credibility of the estimates, comparisons are made 
employing a number of approaches. As expected, the 
magnitudes of the NTMs are found to be higher than 
those of the tariffs, confirming the expectation that non-
tariff impediments have replaced tariff barriers as the 
main form of trade protectionism (Hummels & Schaur, 
2013). 
Comparing with the literature (Bradford, 2003; KNO, 
2009; EP, 2014), the results are broadly comparable, 
although most strikingly, there is a consensus that the 
EU imposes more prohibitive agri-food NTMs than the 
US. In many sectors, the results appear to be credible 
(i.e., cattle meat, pig/poultry meat, fruit and vegetables, 
cereals). Elsewhere, the general magnitudes appear 
to be plausible, although it is debateable whether the 
EU or US AVE should be more restrictive (i.e., dairy, 
processed rice and sugar). For some specific bilateral 
routes there are some counterintuitive results coinciding 
with those sectors where relatively small and volatile 
trans-Atlantic trade flows are observed. In addition, 
estimation difficulties were encountered where there 
are (unexplained) structural breaks within the data. In 
recognition of these issues, a bootstrapping procedure 
was employed to generate confidence intervals in 
order to assess the reliability of each bilateral AVE 
point estimate. Notwithstanding, further work could 
be focused on improving the sector specificity of each 
gravity equation to better capture observed trade trends, 
thereby improving the model’s predictive capacity.  
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